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_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Thomas Wisniewski, appeals from an order 
of the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania dismissing his amended complaint for failure to 
state a claim.  For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse 
in part the District Court’s order and will remand for further 
proceedings. 
I. 
 In 2013, Wisniewski filed a civil rights action pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as defendants officials and 
employees of the State Correctional Institution at Smithfield 
(“SCI-Smithfield”) in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania, where he is 
confined.  In a sprawling amended complaint, Wisniewski 
asserted claims of First Amendment retaliation and violations 
of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
 Wisniewski’s amended complaint alleged that he 
worked as an Inmate Legal Reference Aide in the prison’s 
law library.  Perceiving staffing shortages and believing that 
other library policy decisions were harming the ability of 
inmates to access the courts, he registered complaints with 
prison officials and filed inmate requests about the issues.  He 
asserted that, in turn, he was subject to additional scrutiny 
when, in his library position, he provided legal assistance to 
qualified inmates who had been assigned to his caseload by 
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prison officials.  An inmate specifically assigned to 
Wisniewski’s caseload based on his mental health diagnosis 
sought assistance in preparing a grievance challenging a yard 
policy.  In order to assist the inmate, Wisniewski obtained a 
draft grievance from another inmate regarding the same topic 
to use as a template.  Prison officials discovered the draft 
grievance in Wisniewski’s possession and confiscated it 
based on their suspicions that it was from a notoriously 
litigious inmate and was similar or identical to multiple other 
grievances that had been filed.  A questionnaire originating 
from the attorney for the same litigious inmate was also 
discovered during a subsequent search of Wisniewski’s cell.  
Based on his possession of these documents, Wisniewski was 
charged with, and found guilty of, engaging in or encouraging 
unauthorized group activity, possession or circulation of a 
petition, possession of contraband, and lying to an employee.  
Certain defendants supported the misconduct charge by 
claiming that the documents were “petitions” prohibited 
under prison policy, despite the fact that neither of the 
documents had the requisite three or more signatures to be 
considered a petition under prison guidelines.  Accordingly, 
the misconduct charge was ultimately dismissed, but not until 
Wisniewski had already spent nearly 90 days in the Restricted 
Housing Unit (“RHU”) as a result of the charges.   
 Wisniewski alleged that, in addition to contriving these 
charges and issuing a guilty verdict for conduct that did not 
contradict prison guidelines, the defendants engaged in a 
series of additional actions in retaliation for helping his 
assigned inmate prepare a grievance.  These retaliatory acts 
included removing him from his law library position, 
tampering with his television, denying him yard time, 
delaying his release from disciplinary confinement, 
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interfering with his access to legal materials, and limiting his 
access to a photocopier to copy legal materials.  Wisniewski 
filed multiple grievances challenging the allegedly 
unconstitutional conduct. 
 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss.  The 
Magistrate Judge recommended granting defendants’ motion, 
and the District Court, over Wisniewski’s objections, adopted 
the Magistrate Judge’s report in its entirety and dismissed the 
amended complaint with prejudice.  Specifically, the District 
Court dismissed all of Wisniewski’s claims arising out of 
events that occurred more than two years prior to the filing of 
the complaint based on the statute of limitations.  The District 
Court then dismissed the two remaining First Amendment 
retaliation claims, which related to his limited access to the 
photocopier and his removal from his Inmate Legal Reference 
Aide position, for failure to state a claim.  The District Court 
determined that helping a fellow inmate to prepare a 
grievance was not protected conduct under the First 
Amendment, and that limiting access to a photocopier did not 
constitute an adverse action sufficient to support a First 
Amendment retaliation claim.  Wisniewski timely appealed.1  
II. 
 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 and exercises plenary review over the District Court’s 
dismissal of Wisniewski’s amended complaint.  See Allah v. 
                                              
1 We appointed counsel to represent Wisniewski on appeal.  
Appointed counsel performed admirably and was of immense 
assistance to the Court.  We express our sincere appreciation 
to counsel for the excellent representation of Wisniewski on 
appeal. 
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Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  To survive 
dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007)).  This Court will affirm a district court’s dismissal for 
failure to state a claim “only if, accepting all factual 
allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, [it] determine[s] that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any reasonable reading 
of the complaint.”  McGovern v. City of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 
115 (3d Cir. 2009).  
A. 
 To state a claim for retaliation, a prisoner must allege 
that: (1) he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, 
(2) “he suffered some ‘adverse action’ at the hands of prison 
officials,” and (3) “his constitutionally protected conduct was 
‘a substantial or motivating factor’ in the decision” to take 
that action.   Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 
2001) (citation omitted).  The District Court concluded that 
Wisniewski failed to allege that he engaged in 
constitutionally protected activity because, pursuant to Shaw 
v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001), inmates do not possess an 
independent First Amendment right to provide legal 
assistance to fellow inmates.  We conclude, however, that 
Wisniewski’s allegations regarding his retaliation claim based 
on his removal from his Inmate Legal Reference Aide 
position, are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.   
 “[A]n inmate’s constitutional rights are ‘necessarily 
limited.’”  Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 
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2010) (quoting Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213 (3d 
Cir. 1999)).  Nevertheless, “it is settled law that an inmate 
‘retains those First Amendment rights that are not 
inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate 
penological objectives of the corrections system.’”  Id. 
(quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)); see 
also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (“[W]hen a 
prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, 
the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.”).  In Shaw, on which the District Court 
relied, the Supreme Court declined to give prisoner-to-
prisoner legal assistance any First Amendment protection 
“above and beyond the protection normally accorded 
prisoners’ speech.”  532 U.S. at 231.  Instead, the Supreme 
Court held that prisons may, if consistent with Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), restrict inmates from assisting 
other inmates in legal matters.  Id. at 228-232.   
 Wisniewski alleged that as an Inmate Legal Reference 
Aide, he was responsible for assisting inmates assigned to his 
caseload prepare legal documents, including grievances.  In 
performing those duties, he obtained a copy of a draft 
grievance to use in assisting his assigned inmate prepare a 
grievance challenging the prison’s yard policy.  Wisniewski 
alleged that when prison officials discovered that this material 
belonged to a notoriously litigious inmate and was used in the 
filing of multiple other grievances challenging the same 
policy, they contrived misconduct charges, of which he was 
ultimately cleared, and engaged in a series of retaliatory 
actions, including arranging for his removal from his law 
library position.  Wisniewski’s amended complaint plausibly 
alleged that his conduct in assisting his assigned inmate 
prepare a grievance, which was both pursuant to his job duties 
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and in accordance with prison regulations, was not 
inconsistent with legitimate penological interests, and 
therefore could fall within the limited First Amendment rights 
that prisoners retain.2  See, e.g., Newman, 617 F.3d at 781.  
Cf. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486-90 (1969) 
(protecting the right of access to courts by prohibiting state 
prison officials from actively interfering with inmates’ 
attempts to prepare legal documents).   
 With respect to the second element, the termination of 
prison employment constitutes adverse action sufficient to 
deter the exercise of First Amendment rights, satisfying the 
second element of a retaliation claim at this stage of the 
litigation.3  See, e.g., Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 998 
(10th Cir. 1991)(“[A prisoner] has no right to a job … [but] 
prison officials cannot punish [him for] exercising his first 
amendment rights by denying him certain job assignments or 
                                              
2 Nonetheless, prison officials may still demonstrate that their 
actions were reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.  See, e.g., Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 159 
(3d Cir. 2002) (concluding that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact that prison officials’ actions were “‘reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests,’ and that [plaintiff] 
would have been disciplined notwithstanding his jailhouse 
lawyering.” (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90)).  However, we 
cannot say, at this stage, that Wisniewski’s allegations were 
insufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.  
 
3 At oral argument, counsel for Wisniewski withdrew the 
retaliation claim based upon limits imposed on his access to a 
photocopier.   
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transferring him from one job to another”).  His amended 
complaint also adequately alleged a causal link between his 
provision of legal assistance and his job removal.4     
 Accordingly, accepting as true the factual allegations 
in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn therefrom, we conclude that Wisniewski’s allegations 
regarding his job removal state a plausible claim for relief 
sufficient to survive Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.   
                                              
4 Wisniewski also argues on appeal that his job removal was 
additionally in retaliation for complaints he made about 
staffing shortages in the library.  The District Court did not 
directly address this claim before dismissing the complaint, 
but we believe that Wisniewksi’s allegations raise his right to 
relief above the speculative level.  Wisniewski’s complaints 
to prison officials and inmate requests implicate conduct 
protected by the First Amendment.  See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 
F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003).  Moreover, his amended 
complaint suggests a pattern of retaliation beginning with his 
complaints to prison staff about the prison’s implementation 
of library policies and culminating with the loss of his 
position as an Inmate Legal Reference Aide.  Accordingly, 
construing Wisniewski’s amended complaint liberally, we 
believe that he adequately alleged a causal connection 
between those complaints and his job removal.  Cf. Lauren 
W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 
2007) (noting ways to establish causal link, including through 
“a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing”); Marra v. 
Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 303-05 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(concluding that evidence of a pattern of antagonist behavior 
was sufficient to support a causal link).  
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B. 
 We also conclude that the District Court erred in 
dismissing, at this stage, Wisniewski’s remaining claims 
based on the statute of limitations.  The running of the statute 
of limitations is an affirmative defense.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(c)(1); Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 
1153, 1161 (3d Cir. 1989).  A complaint is subject to 
dismissal for failure to state a claim on statute of limitations 
grounds only when the statute of limitations defense is 
apparent on the face of the complaint.  Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 
F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014).  Wisniewski filed his complaint 
on October 25, 2013.  The statute of limitations applicable to 
§ 1983 claims in Pennsylvania is two years.  See Knoll v. 
Springfield Twp. Sch. Dist., 763 F.2d 584, 585 (3d Cir. 
1985).  “A [§] 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff 
knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] 
action is based.”  Sameric Corp. of Del. v. City of Phila., 142 
F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).  Although Wisniewski argues 
that his claims are timely presented because he suffered a 
continuing wrong, we agree that the District Court properly 
concluded that the continuing violations doctrine does not 
apply to Wisniewski’s claims, as defendants’ actions “had a 
degree of permanence which should trigger [his] awareness of 
and duty to assert his[] rights.”  See Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 
263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001).  Accordingly, absent tolling 
of the statute of limitations, Wisniewski’s claims accruing 
before October 2011 were time-barred.   
 This Court has held, however, that because exhaustion 
of prison administrative remedies is mandatory under the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the statute of 
limitations applicable to § 1983 actions should be tolled while 
a prisoner pursues the mandated remedies.  Pearson v. Sec’y 
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Dep’t of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 603 (3d Cir. 2015).  Although 
Wisniewski’s amended complaint revealed that certain 
instances of allegedly unconstitutional conduct occurred more 
than two years prior to the filing of the complaint, such as the 
confiscation of his leg brace for two days while he was 
housed in the RHU, the allegations did not rule out the 
possibility that the statute of limitations should have been 
tolled while Wisniewski exhausted his administrative 
remedies.  For example, Wisniewski alleged multiple 
instances of retaliatory conduct from approximately April 
2011 through November 2011, during which time he was also 
filing numerous related grievances.  We cannot say, therefore, 
that it was apparent on the face of the amended complaint that 
all claims accruing prior to October 2013 were necessarily 
barred by the statute of limitations.  We conclude that the 
District Court erred in dismissing these claims as barred by 
the statute of limitations without considering whether 
Wisniewski properly exhausted administrative remedies and 
whether and to what extent the limitations period should be 
tolled.  We express no view as to whether Wisniewski’s 
underlying claims will prevail or whether defenses, such as 
the statute of limitations, will prove to be dispositive.5 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order to the extent it dismissed the First Amendment 
retaliation claim based on Wisniewski’s job removal and to 
the extent it dismissed the remaining claims on statute of 
                                              
5 Our decision also does not preclude the District Court from 
considering other bases for dismissal of the claims on 
remand.     
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limitations grounds.  We remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
